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Trovati 13 documenti.

Game theory and the social contract
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Binmore, K. G., (1940-)

Game theory and the social contract / Ken Binmore.

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1994-c1998.

Game theory and the social contract
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Binmore, K. G., (1940-)

Game theory and the social contract / Ken Binmore.

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1994-c1998.

Fun and games
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Binmore, K. G., (1940-)

Fun and games : a text on game theory / Ken Binmore.

Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Heath, c1992.

Game theory
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Fudenberg, Drew.

Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole.

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1991.

Games for business and economics
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Gardner, Roy, (1947-)

Games for business and economics / Roy Gardner.

2nd ed.

Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, c2003.

Nonlinear preference and utility theory
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Libri Moderni

Fishburn, Peter C.

Nonlinear preference and utility theory / Peter C. Fishburn.

Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, c1988.

Johns Hopkins series in the mathematical sciences ; 5

Equity
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Libri Moderni

Young, H. Peyton, (1945-)

Equity : in theory and practice / H. Peyton Young.

Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1994.

Abstract: Governments and institutions, perhaps even more than markets, determine who gets what in our society. They make the crucial choices about who pays the taxes, who gets into college, who gets medical care, who gets drafted, where the hazardous waste dump is sited, and how much we pay for public services. Debate about these issues inevitably centres on the question of whether the solution is "fair". In "Equity: In Theory and Practice", H. Peyton Young offers a systematic explanation of what we mean by fairness in distributing public resources and burdens, and applies the theory to actual cases. Young begins by reviewing some of the major theories of social justice, showing that none of them explains how societies resolve distributive problems in practice. He then suggests an alternative approach to analyzing fairness in concrete situations: equity, he argues, does not boil down to a single formula, but represents a balance between competing principles of need, desert, and social utility. The studies Young uses to illustrate his approach include the design of income tax schedules, priority schemes for allocating scarce medical resources, formulas for distributing political representation, and criteria for setting fees for public services. Each represents a unique blend of historical perspective, rigorous analysis, and an emphasis on practical solutions.

Mathematics and politics
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Libri Moderni

Taylor, Alan D., (1947-)

Mathematics and politics : strategy, voting, power and proof / Alan D. Taylor.

New York : Springer-Verlag, c1995.

Textbooks in mathematical sciences

Abstract: interest in a particular application, however, often depends on his or hergeneralinterestintheareainwhichtheapplicationistakingplace. My experience at Union College has been that there is a real advan­ tage in having students enter the course knowing thatvirtually all the applications will focus on a single discipline-in this case, political science. The level ofpresentation assumes no college-level mathematicalor social science prerequisites. The philosophy underlying the approach we have taken in this book is based on the sense that we (mathemati­ cians)havetendedtomaketwoerrorsinteachingnonsciencestudents: wehaveoverestimatedtheircomfortwithcomputationalmaterial,and we have underestimated their ability to handle conceptual material. Thus, while there is very little algebra (and certainly no calculus) in our presentation, we have included numerous logical arguments that students in the humanitiesand the socialscienceswill find accessible, but not trivial. The book contains five main topics: a m.odel of escalation, game­ theoretic models of international conflict, yes-no voting systems, political power, and social choice. The first partofthe text is made up of a single chapter devoted to each topic. The second part of the text revisits each topic, again with a single chapter devoted to each. The organizationofthe bookisbasedonpedagogicalconsiderations, with the material becoming somewhat more sophisticated as one moves through the ten chapters. On the other hand, within any given chap­ terthere is little reliance on material from earlierchapters, except for those devoted to the same topic.

The mathematics of voting and elections
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Libri Moderni

Hodge, Jonathan K., (1980-)

The mathematics of voting and elections : a hands-on approach / Jonathan K. Hodge, Richard E. Klima.

Providence, RI : American Mathematical Society, 2005.

Mathematical world, ; v. 22

Abstract: Have you ever wondered ... why elections often produce results that seem to be displeasing to many of the voters involved? Would you be surprised to learn that a perfectly fair election can produce an outcome that literally nobody likes? When voting, we often think about the candidates or proposals in the election, but we rarely consider the procedures that we use to express our preferences and arrive at a collective decision. The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach will help you discover answers to these and many other questions. Easily accessible to anyone interested in the subject, the book requires virtually no prior mathematical experience beyond basic arithmetic, and includes numerous examples and discussions regarding actual elections from politics and popular culture. It is recommended for researchers and advanced undergraduates interested in all areas of mathematics and is ideal for independent study.

Behavioral game theory
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Libri Moderni

Camerer, Colin, (1959-)

Behavioral game theory : experiments in strategic interaction / Colin F. Camerer.

New York, N.Y. : Russell Sage Foundation ; Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2003.

The roundtable series in behavioral economics

Abstract: Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.

Moral sentiments and material interests
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Libri Moderni

Moral sentiments and material interests : the foundations of cooperation in economic life / edited by Herbert Gintis ... [et al.].

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2004.

Abstract: Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group. Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing).

Oligopoly and the theory of games
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Libri Moderni

Friedman, James W.

Oligopoly and the theory of games / James W. Friedman.

Amsterdam ; New York : North-Holland Pub. Co. ; New York : sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada Elsevier/North-Holland, 1977.

Games in economic development
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Libri Moderni

Wydick, Bruce <1954->

Games in economic development / Bruce Wydick.

New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Abstract: Games in Economic Development examines the roots of poverty and prosperity through the lens of elementary game theory, illustrating how patterns of human interaction can lead to vicious cycles of poverty as well as virtuous cycles of prosperity. The book shows how both social norms and carefully designed institutions can help shape the "rules of the game," making better outcomes in a game possible for everyone involved. The book is entertaining to read, intended for a broad audience, and can be accessed with little background in development economics or game theory. Its chapters explore games in natural resource use; education; coping with risk; borrowing and lending; technology adoption; governance and corruption; civil conflict; international trade; and the importance of networks, religion, and identity, illustrating concepts with numerous anecdotes from recent world events. An appendix explaining basic ideas in game theory used in the book is provided for interested readers.