Trovati 10 documenti.
Trovati 10 documenti.
Lexington, Mass. : D.C. Heath, c1992.
Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, c1988.
Johns Hopkins series in the mathematical sciences ; 5
New York : Springer-Verlag, c1995.
Textbooks in mathematical sciences
Abstract: interest in a particular application, however, often depends on his or hergeneralinterestintheareainwhichtheapplicationistakingplace. My experience at Union College has been that there is a real advan tage in having students enter the course knowing thatvirtually all the applications will focus on a single discipline-in this case, political science. The level ofpresentation assumes no college-level mathematicalor social science prerequisites. The philosophy underlying the approach we have taken in this book is based on the sense that we (mathemati cians)havetendedtomaketwoerrorsinteachingnonsciencestudents: wehaveoverestimatedtheircomfortwithcomputationalmaterial,and we have underestimated their ability to handle conceptual material. Thus, while there is very little algebra (and certainly no calculus) in our presentation, we have included numerous logical arguments that students in the humanitiesand the socialscienceswill find accessible, but not trivial. The book contains five main topics: a m.odel of escalation, game theoretic models of international conflict, yes-no voting systems, political power, and social choice. The first partofthe text is made up of a single chapter devoted to each topic. The second part of the text revisits each topic, again with a single chapter devoted to each. The organizationofthe bookisbasedonpedagogicalconsiderations, with the material becoming somewhat more sophisticated as one moves through the ten chapters. On the other hand, within any given chap terthere is little reliance on material from earlierchapters, except for those devoted to the same topic.
Providence, RI : American Mathematical Society, 2005.
Mathematical world, ; v. 22
Abstract: Have you ever wondered ... why elections often produce results that seem to be displeasing to many of the voters involved? Would you be surprised to learn that a perfectly fair election can produce an outcome that literally nobody likes? When voting, we often think about the candidates or proposals in the election, but we rarely consider the procedures that we use to express our preferences and arrive at a collective decision. The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach will help you discover answers to these and many other questions. Easily accessible to anyone interested in the subject, the book requires virtually no prior mathematical experience beyond basic arithmetic, and includes numerous examples and discussions regarding actual elections from politics and popular culture. It is recommended for researchers and advanced undergraduates interested in all areas of mathematics and is ideal for independent study.
New York, N.Y. : Russell Sage Foundation ; Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2003.
The roundtable series in behavioral economics
Abstract: Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2004.
Abstract: Moral Sentiments and Material Interests presents an innovative synthesis of research in different disciplines to argue that cooperation stems not from the stereotypical selfish agent acting out of disguised self-interest but from the presence of "strong reciprocators" in a social group. Presenting an overview of research in economics, anthropology, evolutionary and human biology, social psychology, and sociology, the book deals with both the theoretical foundations and the policy implications of this explanation for cooperation. Chapter authors in the remaining parts of the book discuss the behavioral ecology of cooperation in humans and nonhuman primates, modeling and testing strong reciprocity in economic scenarios, and reciprocity and social policy. The evidence for strong reciprocity in the book includes experiments using the famous Ultimatum Game (in which two players must agree on how to split a certain amount of money or they both get nothing).
Amsterdam ; New York : North-Holland Pub. Co. ; New York : sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada Elsevier/North-Holland, 1977.
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Abstract: Games in Economic Development examines the roots of poverty and prosperity through the lens of elementary game theory, illustrating how patterns of human interaction can lead to vicious cycles of poverty as well as virtuous cycles of prosperity. The book shows how both social norms and carefully designed institutions can help shape the "rules of the game," making better outcomes in a game possible for everyone involved. The book is entertaining to read, intended for a broad audience, and can be accessed with little background in development economics or game theory. Its chapters explore games in natural resource use; education; coping with risk; borrowing and lending; technology adoption; governance and corruption; civil conflict; international trade; and the importance of networks, religion, and identity, illustrating concepts with numerous anecdotes from recent world events. An appendix explaining basic ideas in game theory used in the book is provided for interested readers.