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The uses and abuses of history
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MacMillan, Margaret, (1943-)

The uses and abuses of history / Margaret MacMillan.

Toronto : Viking Canada, 2008.

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The shape of reason
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Libri Moderni

Girotto, V., (1957-)

The shape of reason : essays in honour of Paolo Legrenzi / edited by Vittorio Girotto and Philip N. Johnson-Laird.

Hove ; New York : Psychology Press, 2005.

Abstract: In this volume, leading international cognitive psychologists elucidate and engage with the invaluable contribution of Paolo Legrenzi to the field of thinking and reasoning.

The shape of reason
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Libri Moderni

Girotto, V.

The shape of reason : essays in honour of Paolo Legrenzi / edited by Vittorio Girotto and Philip N. Johnson-Laird.

Hove ; New York : Psychology Press, 2005.

Abstract: In this volume, leading international cognitive psychologists elucidate and engage with the invaluable contribution of Paolo Legrenzi to the field of thinking and reasoning.

Rational herds
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Libri Moderni

Chamley, Christophe.

Rational herds : economic models of social learning / Christophe P. Chamley.

Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, c2004.

Behavioral game theory
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Camerer, Colin, (1959-)

Behavioral game theory : experiments in strategic interaction / Colin F. Camerer.

New York, N.Y. : Russell Sage Foundation ; Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2003.

The roundtable series in behavioral economics

Abstract: Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology. Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks ..." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.

Decision making
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Decision making : descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions / edited by David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa, and Amos Tversky.

Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1988.

A primer on decision making
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March, James G.

A primer on decision making : how decisions happen / James G. March, with the assistance of Chip Heath.

New York : Free Press ; Toronto : Maxwell Macmillan Canada ; New York : Maxwell Macmillan International, c1994.

Making better decisions
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Libri Moderni

Gilboa, Itzhak.

Making better decisions : decision theory in practice / Itzhak Gilboa.

Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

Abstract: Making Better Decisions introduces readers to some of the principal aspects of decision theory, and examines how these might lead us to make better decisions. Introduces readers to key aspects of decision theory and examines how they might help us make better decisions Presentation of material encourages readers to imagine a situation and make a decision or a judgment Offers a broad coverage of the subject including major insights from several sub-disciplines: microeconomic theory, decision theory, game theory, social choice, statistics, psychology, and philosophy Explains these insights informally in a language that has minimal mathematical notation or jargon, even when describing and interpreting mathematical theorems Critically assesses the theory presented within the text, as well as some of its critiques Includes a web resource for teachers and students.

Theory of decision under uncertainty
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Libri Moderni

Gilboa, Itzhak.

Theory of decision under uncertainty / Itzhak Gilboa.

New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Abstract: This title describes the classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty, as well as critiques thereof and alternative theories.

Utility theories
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Libri Moderni

Edwards, Ward <1927-2005.>

Utility theories : measurements and applications / edited by Ward Edwards.

Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, c1992.

Studies in risk and uncertainty

Abstract: The Conference on "Utility: Theories, Measurements, and Applications" met at the Inn at Pasatiempo in Santa Cruz, California, from June II to 15, 1989. The all-star cast of attendees are listed as authors in the Table of Contents of this book (see p. V), except for Soo Hong Chew and Amos Tversky. The purpose of the conference, and of National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-8823012 that supported it, was to confront proponents of new generalized theories of utility with leading decision analysts com- mitted to the implementation, in practice, of the more traditional theory that these new theories reject. That traditional model is variously iden- tified in this book as expected utility or subjectively expected utility maximization (EU or SEU for short) and variously attributed to von Neumann and Morgenstern or Savage. I had feared that the conference might consist of an acrimonious debate between Olympian normative theorists uninterested in what people actually do and behavioral modelers obsessed with the cognitive illusions and uninterested in helping people to make wise decisions. I was entirely wrong. The conferees, in two dramatic straw votes at the open- ing session, unanimously endorsed traditional SEU as the appropriate normative model and unanimously agreed that people don't act as that model requires.

Nonlinear preference and utility theory
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Libri Moderni

Fishburn, Peter C.

Nonlinear preference and utility theory / Peter C. Fishburn.

Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, c1988.

Johns Hopkins series in the mathematical sciences ; 5